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Slick Daddy
e01092aa38
* Kernel FS: default-deny unmapped guest paths (fixes absolute-path host escape)
ResolveGuestPath returned any unrecognized guest path verbatim as the host
path. Because absolute paths ("/etc/passwd", "C:\Windows\...") are already
fully qualified, they skipped the relative-path app0 fallback and were handed
straight to FileStream/File.Delete/etc., giving a malicious game arbitrary
host-file read/write/delete outside the sandbox.
Return string.Empty (deny) on fallthrough instead. Most callers already treat
a nonexistent host path as NOT_FOUND; open/truncate/rename get an explicit
empty-path guard so a denied path can't reach FileStream and throw an
ArgumentException their catch blocks don't cover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Kernel FS: contain built-in mounts (fixes Windows drive-letter injection)
The built-in mount branches (app0/temp0/download0/hostapp/devlog) combined
the mount-relative guest path onto the host root without re-checking
containment. NormalizeMountRelativePath clamps ./.. but splits only on
separators, so a drive-qualified token like "C:" survives as a segment and
Path.Combine then discards the mount root, yielding a raw host path such as
"C:\Windows\..." (arbitrary host read/write).
Route every built-in branch through a new CombineWithinMount helper that
re-resolves with Path.GetFullPath and verifies the result stays under the
mount root -- the same guard TryResolveRegisteredGuestMount already applied.
Denied paths return string.Empty, which callers treat as unresolved.
AprStreamingContractTests passed a raw Path.GetTempFileName() as the guest
path, relying on the now-removed absolute-path passthrough; updated it to
address the file through a registered mount.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Kernel FS: reject reparse points inside mounts (fixes symlink escape)
Lexical containment (Path.GetFullPath + StartsWith) proves the textual
path stays under the mount root but does not follow symlinks/junctions.
A malicious game dump could plant a reparse point inside app0/temp0/etc.
pointing outside it, so a contained-looking path resolved onto the host
filesystem. Walk each existing component from the mount root to the
candidate and refuse any reparse point, in both the built-in and
registered-mount resolution paths. Mirrors AvPlayer's existing defense.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Kernel FS: fail closed when path containment cannot be verified
The reparse-point and drive-letter containment guards call Path.GetFullPath
and File.GetAttributes on untrusted guest paths. Both throw on crafted
over-long or invalid-char input, and ResolveGuestPath runs outside the file
syscalls' try blocks, so such a path was a guest-triggerable crash rather
than a denial.
Wrap the GetFullPath calls in CombineWithinMount and the registered-mount
path, and widen the GetAttributes catch, to treat any access/format failure
as an escape (deny) instead of propagating. Also tighten the ".." fallback
check so a legitimate file named "..foo" is not falsely rejected, and hoist
the repeated Path.GetFullPath(mountRoot) into a local.
Adds a regression test asserting the resolver returns without throwing for
an over-long and a NUL-embedded path under a mount.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Kernel FS: assert malformed paths resolve to empty, not just no-throw
The fail-closed regression test asserted only Assert.NotNull, which a
non-nullable string return can never violate via its value (only a throw,
which aborts the test earlier anyway). Tighten to Assert.Equal(string.Empty)
so it also locks in fail-CLOSED: a regression where a malformed path resolved
to a non-empty host path would now be caught.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Kernel FS: route new AMPR batch tests through a registered mount
Merging main brought in three AprStreamingContractTests that pass raw
Path.GetTempFileName()/temp host paths as guest paths. The default-deny
resolver from this branch rejects absolute host paths, so MissingMidBatch
failed at index 0 instead of the intended index 1. Address the present
file through a registered mount (as ResolveStatAndReadFile already does)
so entries 0 and 2 resolve and the batch fails at the genuinely-missing
entry. The two all-missing tests were unaffected but share the fix's intent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Kernel FS: make a matched-mount denial terminal; fix Unix-only test asserts
A registered mount that claims a path by prefix but denies it (failed
containment or a reparse point inside the mount) now short-circuits in
ResolveGuestPath instead of falling through to the built-in mount branches.
The fall-through let an overlapping prefix (a registered "/app0" vs the
built-in SHARPEMU_APP0_DIR branch, which resolves against a cached root)
re-resolve a denied path and turn the denial back into a resolution -- the
reparse-point escape reappeared on Linux CI through exactly this path.
Also fix two tests that asserted Windows-specific behavior unconditionally:
a "C:\..." path is not absolute on Unix (it resolves contained under the
mount there), and that case is now pinned to Windows only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: slick-daddy <slick-daddy@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>